Adurable-goods monopolist who will be introducing new and improved versions of his product must decide how to price his products, keeping in mind the relative attractiveness of the current and future products. Dhebar (1994) has shown that if technology is changing too quickly and the producer cannot credibly commit to future prices and quality, then no equilibrium strategy exists. That is, there is no credible strategy for the future product that the producer can commit to in the first period. We show that an equilibrium pricing strategy exists if the monopolist does not offer upgrade pricing, that is, special pricing to consumers who have bought an earlier version. The author shows the possible purchase patterns in equilibrium and derives the optimal pricing strategy.
Introduction
When technology is changing rapidly, consumers face a "buy or wait" decision problem in which they trade off the benefit of having the best available technology with the cost of acquiring it. Likewise, producers of sequential versions of products have a tradeoff to make. When producers introduce a sequence of new products, for example, improving versions of software, they must decide how to price the current version of the product relative to future versions of the product. In the present, the producer wants the current version to look more attractive and future versions to look less attractive. But as time passes, the once future version becomes current and the producer then wants it to look more attractive.
We extend the analysis of Dhebar (1994) , who models the problem of a durable-goods monopolist selling sequential versions of a product (Versions 1 and 2) in a setting with no secondhand markets. In Dhebar's model, the producer sells only Version 1 in the first period and Version 2 in the second period. The consumers are rational; each one decides on market participation and purchase timing to maximize his surplus, benefit minus price. Dhebar looks at two cases: one in which technology is changing at a moderate pace and another in which technology is changing at a rapid pace. In the latter case, he shows that the rapidity of change leads to a situation in which there is no subgame perfect equilibrium pricing and quality strategy in which the producer earns revenue in both periods. In other words, there is no credible strategy for Version 2 that the monopolist can commit to in Period 1. In an extension with upgrades, Dhebar shows that no equilibrium exists under rapid technological change because the monopolist has the incentive to set a low second period price to attract consumers who did not buy in the first period. Dhebar (1994 Dhebar ( , 1996 argues that the disequilibrium imposes a demand-side constraint on how quickly improved products can be introduced.
In this paper, we use a similar set up to Dhebar (1994) : The monopolist's two-period problem with rational consumers and no secondhand markets. In our model, the technological improvement is exogenous and happens between Periods 1 and 2 (in contrast to Moorthy and Png 1992, in which both products are available in the first period). We improvement if the monopolist does not offer any upgrade pricing, that is, special pricing for customers who have purchased previous versions. By only selling the full version of the product at a single price, the monopolist eliminates his own incentive to target the low end of the market (the people who did not buy in the first period) in the second period.
Within 
Model
Our model follows Dhebar (1994) . The supplier is a monopolist with zero marginal costs1 who sells sequential versions of one product. He will be introducing improved versions of the product, and he uses a strategy of product replacement: He sells only the latest generation in any period. In Period 1, only Version 1 is for sale; in Period 2, only Version 2 is for sale. All of the analytical results and examples are based on a two-period horizon for the producer.
We assume that in each period, a consumer can buy zero units or one unit of the product, consumers do not participate in secondhand markets, and consumers share discount factor 8 with the producer. The consumer's incremental valuation of generation j given that he holds generation i is a separable function of incremental quality qij and consumer index v.
Quality is assumed to be a one-dimensional metric.
The increase in quality from generation i to generation j is denoted qij, and the function f(qij) is increasing in qij. The measure qj is increasing in j and decreasing in i. The convention in this paper is that before the first period, all consumers hold nothing, or "generation O." This separable function is similar to Dhebar (1994), with the following generalization. What we refer to as q01 and q02 Dhebar (1994) calls ql and q2, respectively. In his analysis of upgrades, the incremental value from upgrading for consumer v is (f(q2)-f(ql))g(v). Our model is slightly more general in that f(q12)g(v), the incremental value going from Version KORNISH Pricingfor a Durable-Goods Monopolist Under Rapid Sequential Innovation 1 to Version 2 for consumer v, is not restricted to be (f(q02)-f(qo1))g(v). This formulation allows for two new possibilities. First, the consumer may realize more benefit from Version 2 having used Version 1 (compared to not having used Version 1). Second, the consumer may realize less benefit from Version 2 having used Version 1. In the first case (more benefit), the consumers may have gained knowledge in using Version 1 that makes Version 2 worth more to them. In the second case (less benefit), the consumers may face some cost of "uninstalling" Version 1 so they can replace it with Version 2.
However, we do require that
which implies that if everything were free, it is better to have Version 1 and then switch to Version 2 than it is to wait for Version 2. This assumption places a limit on the size of the switching cost. The size of the 
We define the single-period profit maximizing price Pol for the first period
Finally, we restrict our attention to the case of rapid change, with technology improving in present value, i.e., f(ql) < 8f(qo2).
This is the case for which Dhebar (1994) shows that an equilibrium cannot exist under the upgrade pricing scheme.
Analysis
In this section, we look at the existence and nature of equilibrium solutions to the two-period problem in which the producer does not offer special upgrade pricing to people who bought in the first period. In ?3.1, we derive the consumer purchase patterns for any given set of prices ( PROOF. See the appendix. These three cases cover the entire (PlI' P2) space as shown in Figure 1 . In all three possibilities (see Figure 2 ), higher-end consumers are buying more often and/or higher versions than lower-end consumers. The three regions are characterized by which version of the product is priced more aggressively relative to the other. En Region I, it is Version 1; in Region II, it is neither version; in Region III, it is Version 2.
Region I can be characterized as the "low introductory price" region; there is a limit to how high KORNISH Pricing for a Durable-Goods Monopolist Under Rapid Sequential Innovation p, can be relative to P2 in this region. Because the price of Version 1 is comparatively low, that version is attractive to a large segment of consumers. Some of those consumers (the ones at the high end) also buy Version 2.
In Region II, there is both a limit to how high pi can be relative to P2 and a limit to how high P2 can be relative to pl. This is the "moderation" region-neither product is priced in an aggressive manner relative to the other. In Region II, we see what Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) call leapfrogging: Some people who bought in the first period don't buy in Period 2 and some who didn't buy in Period 1 do buy in Period 2.
Finally, in Region III, there is a limit to how high P2 can be relative to Pl. This scenario features a very desirable Version 2; not only is the product greatly improved, but the price is attractive relative to Version 1. Consequently, the purchase pattern in this region includes people who wait for Version 2 and does not include any people who only buy Version 1. The next step in this analysis is to determine which of the three purchase patterns are consistent with optimizing behavior on the part of the producer.
Producer Optimization
Each of the three regions from Proposition 1 presents a constrained optimization problem. The objective function (revenue) is dictated by the purchase pattern associated with the region, and the constraints come from two sources. The first source of constraints is the condition for which the purchase pattern holds (for example, P2 < f(qo2)Pl/f(qo0), for the third case), and the second source of constraints is the condition that the producer sell in both periods.
3.2.1. Region I. According to the purchase pattern for the first region, the highest valuation consumers buy in both periods, the middle valuation consumers buy in the first period only, and the lowest valuation consumers do not buy at all.
To ensure subgame perfection, we solve the secondperiod problem first. In the second period, the producer sells to {v: g(v) > p2/f(q12)}, and so he solves the following problem: producer's second-period price would have to be governed by a concern for eliminating consumer regret rather than profit maximization.
In the equilibrium given in Proposition 2, the firstperiod price is lower than P*,, the single-period profit maximizing price. This purchase pattern-low valuers buy nothing, middle valuers buy 1 only, high valuers buy both-is based on selling to a "large" group of consumers in the first period and selling to some of them again in the second period. To get the "large" base in the first period, the first-period price is low.
Proposition 2 shows that the "low introductory price" strategy is feasible in the sense that there is a Version 2 price that the producer can promise to charge that will not cause any consumers to regret their decisions. Conceptually, a low introductory price is appealing because it makes Version 1 attractive based on price; Version 2 will be a big performance improvement over Version 1, so a low price for Version 1 encourages first-period sales. 
Region II. The second region has a purchase pattern with four parts (from lowest to high
Constraints (28) and (29) 
We find which equilibrium point yields higher revenues given a value of 8. For all 8 > 0.5, the RI > R"'.
The expression for RI is increasing in 8 for 8 < 0.75 and decreasing for 6 > 0.75. For 0.4 < 8 < 0.75, faster is better: Revenue would be higher if the period were shorter. But for 0.75 < 8 < 1, the demand-side issue that Dhebar (1994) We start in the second period. We look at the conditions under which the unconstrained optimal solution satisfies the constraints. The optimal solution to the unconstrained second-period problem is P2 = f(q12)p0i/f(qoi). That result follows from the similarity of the objective functions in (4) and (10). From (4), we can see that 0 < p*l < f(qoi), so Constraints (11) and (12) are met. Constraint (13) is met if
